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Abstract	
	
Variations	in	the	character,	performance	and	impact	of	policies	and	practices	to	
capture	land	value	for	the	community	are	usually	examined	by	analysing	
experience	in	different	countries.	Such	international	comparative	research	is	
cross-sectional	and	does	not	cover	the	evolving	relations	between	systems	of	
land	value	capture	and	the	economies,	polities	and	societies	within	which	they	
are	set.	The	paper	examines	the	relations	in	England	between	the	extant	political	
economy	and	supporting	ideologies,	and	the	distinctive	forms	of	land	value	
capture	that	they	produced.	It	traces	the	shift	from	a	top-down,	strategic	
approach	in	an	era	of	corporatist	government	before	1979	to	the	subsequent	
extension	and	consolidation	of	bottom-up	practice	set	within	the	context	of	
neoliberalism.	The	analysis	highlights	the	evolution	of	the	idea	of	land	value	
capture	and	the	policies	and	practices	associated	with	it,	especially	the	
contestation	that	informed	such	changes.	
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Introduction	
	
Land	value	capture	(LVC)	has	been	a	subject	of	increasing	interest	in	recent	
years.	This	is	partly	because	the	physically	manifest,	spatially	fixed	nature	of	real	
property	is	an	attractive	target	for	tax	authorities	in	the	face	of	rapidly	
accelerating	global	monetary	flows.	Assessments	of	the	effectiveness	of	different	
approaches	to	land	value	capture	focus	on	experience	in	different	countries	(e.g.	
Monk	and	Crook,	2016).	Such	international	comparative	research	is	cross-
sectional.	Consequently,	it	does	not	cover	the	evolving	relations	between	systems	
of	land	value	capture	and	the	economies,	polities	and	societies	within	which	they	
are	set.	The	paucity	of	longitudinal	studies	is	unsurprising	because	there	are	
very	few	countries	where	both	the	system	and	its	context	have	exhibited	
substantive	change.	England	is	one	such.	
	
The	first	three	major	post-war	attempts	to	address	the	‘land	problem’	–	the	
Town	&	Country	Planning	Act	1947,	the	Land	Commission	Act	1967	and	the	
Community	Land	Scheme	1975/76	–	were	pursued	in	an	era	of	corporatist	
government	(Cox,	1984).	In	contrast,	the	use	of	planning	obligations	(POs)	–	
latterly	in	combination	with	the	Community	Infrastructure	Levy	(CIL)	–	has	
developed	within	the	context	of	‘roll-out’	neoliberalism	(Peck	and	Tickell,	2002).	
Most	histories	of	these	systems	have	emphasised	their	fitness	or	otherwise	for	
purpose	(c.f.	Lichfield	and	Darin-Drabkin,	1980).	Little	consideration	has	been	
given	to	the	relations	between	these	very	different	political	economies	and	the	
distinctive	forms	of	land	value	capture	that	they	produced.		
	
The	paper	addresses	this	lacuna	by	presenting	a	diachronic	account	of	the	
evolution	of	ideas,	policies	and	practices	directed	at	land	value	capture,	and	
interpreting	it	through	the	lens	of	discursive	institutionalism.	Our	argument	is	
that	prevailing	economic	orthodoxies	legitimise	the	efficacy	of	some	policies	and	
practices	over	others.	There	is,	in	short,	a	coevolution	of	approaches	to	LVC	with	
paradigmatic	ideologies	of	political	economy.	The	centralised	technocratic	
approach	associated	with	corporatist	post-war	Britain	ultimately	gave	way	to	a	
bottom-up,	distributed	system	within	neoliberalism.	Our	analysis	hence	explores	
the	processes	of	adoption,	adaptation,	opposition	and	reform	to	which	the	idea	of	
land	value	capture	was	subjected.	
	
Explaining	change	in	political	economy	using	discursive	institutionalism	
	
In	the	examination	of	how	and	why	political	economy	changes,	the	influence	of	
ideas	has	tended	to	play	a	secondary	role	to	interest-based	explanations	(Blyth,	
2002,	7).	However,	recent	theory	has	sought	to	integrate	insights	about	the	role	
of	ideas	with	how	these	interact	with	institutional	contexts	(see	Hay,	2006).	This	
resulted	in	the	establishment	of	discursive	institutionalism	as	an	important	
analytical	approach	in	the	fields	of	policy	and	European	Union	studies.	Other	
variants	of	new	institutionalist	thought	have	been	criticised	for	their	inability	to	
explain	political	change.	In	response,	discursive	institutionalism	focuses	
explicitly	on	how	policy	settlements	emerge	from	new	ideational	and	discursive	
formations	(cf.	Ross,	2013;	Carstensen	and	Schmidt,	2016;	Koning,	2016;	
Widmaier,	2016;	Grube	and	van	Acker,	2017;	Leipold	and	Winkel	,2017).	
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Discursive	institutionalists	are	hence	concerned	with	both	the	substantive	
content	of	ideas	and	the	ways	and	the	contexts	in	which	they	are	used,	that	is,	the	
discourse	(Schmidt,	2008).		
	
Crucially,	just	as	institutions	can	be	path	dependent,	ideas	can	also	exert	
constraints	on	political	action.	Ideas	and	norms	are	seen	as	dynamic,	inter-
subjective	constructs	rather	than	static	structures	(Carstensen	and	Schmidt,	
2016).	Discursive	institutionalists	hence	build	upon	the	concept	of	policy	
paradigms	(Hall,	1993):	cognitive	filters	that	pervade	the	world	of	politicians,	
bureaucrats,	some	epistemic	communities	and	even	the	wider	public.	They	
specify	not	just	the	goals	of	policy	but	also	the	instruments	that	are	deemed	
appropriate	for	deployment	in	attaining	these	goals.	In	short,	they	define	the	
boundaries	of	what	is	understood	to	be	politically	and	practically	feasible	at	
particular	points	in	time.	Hall	(1993)	argued	that	ideas	and	paradigms	are	
articulated	and	evolve	at	three	levels.		
	
Third-order	change	occurs	at	the	macro-level	of	overarching	ideas	and	
assumptions	that	inform	the	development	of	fundamental	policy:	for	example,	
Keynesianism	and	neoliberalism	and	the	differing	emphases	given	to	reciprocity,	
redistribution	and	exchange	in	socio-economic	relations	(Polyani,	1957).	It	may	
be	engendered	by	the	power	of	one	set	of	actors	to	impose	its	paradigm	on	
others	(Hall,	1993)	or	by	the	accumulation	of	anomalies	that	the	existing	
paradigm	fails	to	address	or	by	policy	failures.	Because	these	paradigms	are	less	
regularly	debated	than	lower-level	issues	and	only	become	politicised	at	
moments	of	perceived	crisis,	they	remain	‘background	ideas’	(Schmidt,	2008).	
The	meso-level	is	affected	by	second-order	changes	in	the	institutional	
arrangements	and	instruments	used	to	achieve	the	objectives	established	by	
paradigmatic	ideas.	Finally,	first-order	change	at	the	micro-level	affects	the	
precise	settings	of	those	instruments	in	detailed	terms.	
	
Schmidt	(2008;	2010)	adds	two	more	dimensions:	cognitive	and	normative	ideas.	
Cognitive	ideas	link	individual	policies	(first-order)	with	wider	problem	
definition	and	associated	sets	of	appropriate	policy	interventions	(second-order),	
and	how	these	“mesh	with	the	deeper	core	of	(third-order)	principles	and	norms	
of	relevant	scientific	disciplines	or	technical	practices.”	(Schmidt,	2008,	307)	
Normative	ideas	similarly	span	the	three	levels	but	do	so	to	persuade	others	of	
the	efficacy	and	desirability	of	action	(Schmidt,	2008;	2010).	Ideational	power	is	
hence	the	“capacity	of	actors	(whether	individual	or	collective)	to	influence	other	
actors’	normative	and	cognitive	beliefs	through	the	use	of	ideational	elements.”	
(Carstensen	and	Schmidt,	2016,	302)	Such	power	is	particularly	effective	when	
linked	with	substantive	economic	interests	(Campbell,	1998).		
	
We	employ	the	discursive	institutional	approach	because	it	offers	a	set	of	tools	to	
understand	how	ideas-as-discourse	permeate	politics	and	economics	and	
affect/effect	policy	change.	Here	we	use	it	as	a	framework	for	a	necessarily	
synoptic	exploration	of	the	evolution	of	the	political	economy	of	LVC	from	a	
corporatist	to	a	neoliberal	approach.	The	interaction	of	ideas	with	material	
institutional	constraints	is	a	key	feature	of	the	analysis	we	present	below.	
	
	 4	
Corporatist	attempts	to	capture	land	development	value	
	
The	basic	case	
Prior	to	1947	a	planning	system	existed	but	the	right	to	develop	land	belonged	to	
the	landowner.	The	implications	for	the	interaction	of	the	planning	system	and	
the	property	market	can	best	be	understood	through	illustrative	examples.	If	an	
owner	of	agricultural	land	obtained	planning	permission	for	residential	
development	s/he	would	be	able	to	sell	the	land	for	full	market	value	to	a	private	
housebuilder.		If	a	similar	landowner	were	prevented	from	exercising	her/his	
right	to	develop	the	land	by	the	refusal	of	planning	permission	then	
compensation	equivalent	to	the	loss	of	development	value	would	be	required.		If	
a	third	landowner	sold	his/her	site	to	a	public	developer	(for	‘council	housing’,	
for	example),	then	the	transaction	would	be	at	full	market	value.			
	
Figure	1:	Land	Value	Structure	and	Approaches	to	Land	Value	Capture	
	
	
	
In	such	a	policy	regime	individual	landowners	are	treated	equitably:	they	all	
receive	the	same	price	for	their	land	whatever	the	circumstances.	In	addition,	the	
supply	of	land	for	development	is	forthcoming	because	development	values	are	
sufficiently	high	to	persuade	landowners	to	sell	(see	Figure	1a).	However,	it	is	
extremely	difficult	to	achieve	effective	planning	because	local	planning	
authorities	can	rarely	afford	to	compensate	landowners	for	loss	of	development	
value	and,	therefore,	rarely	refuse	planning	permission.	In	addition,	public	
bodies	must	pay	market	value	for	land	for	infrastructure	and	services	that,	in	
turn,	increase	land	values.	These	circumstances	offend	against	a	moral	argument	
of	land	reformers	articulated,	for	example,	by	the	Liberal	Party	in	the	early	
twentieth	century.	
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The	growth	in	value,	more	especially	of	urban	sites,	is	due	to	no	
expenditure	of	capital	or	thought	on	the	part	of	the	ground	owner,	but	
entirely	owing	to	the	energy	and	enterprise	of	the	community	…	It	is	
undoubtedly	one	of	the	worst	evils	of	our	present	system	of	land	tenure	
that	instead	of	reaping	the	benefit	of	the	common	endeavour	of	its	citizens	
a	community	has	always	to	pay	a	heavy	penalty	to	its	ground	landlords	for	
putting	up	the	value	of	their	land.	(Rt	Hon	David	Lloyd	George	–	Official	
Report,	29th	April	1909,	Vol	IV,	Col	532;	cited	in	the	HMG,	1974,	1)	
	
The	above	argument	related	to	the	Housing,	Town	Planning,	Etc.	Act	1909	that	
contained	a	betterment	levy	of	100	per	cent,	subsequently	reduced	to	50	per	
cent	by	the	House	of	Lords.	Later,	the	1932	Planning	Act	provided	for	a	75	per	
cent	levy	(Lichfield	and	Darin-Drabkin,	1980,	130;	see	also	Sutcliffe,	1988;	Booth	
and	Huxley,	2012).	Both	these	acts,	as	with	others	during	the	inter-war	period,	
lacked	a	comprehensive	planning	system	to	support	efforts	to	direct	
development.	Indeed,	the	Barlow	Commission	(1937-1940)	into	the	distribution	
of	the	industrial	population	recognised	that	the	issue	of	compensation	and	
betterment	hampered	the	development	of	planning	(Lichfield	and	Darin-Drabkin,	
1980).	
	
The	planning	system	and	development	values	
In	the	interwar	years	the	potential	for	land-use	planning	was	recognised	by	all	
political	parties,	although	ideas	differed	about	how	such	a	system	might	work	in	
practice.	The	Labour	Party’s	1918	constitution	committed	it	to	the	idea	of	
wholesale	nationalisation	of	land	in	the	UK,	but	it	backed	away	from	this	
commitment	whenever	it	was	in	power	(see	Tichelar,	1997;	2003;	2008;	Manton,	
2006;	Weiler,	2008;	2013;	Fitzpatrick,	2016).	Circumstances	pertaining	to	the	
immediate	post-war	period	had	a	profound	influence	on	the	reform	of	the	UK	
system	of	land	use	planning	and	taxation.	Prest	(1981)	argues	that	in	the	longer	
view,	such	actions	were	a	way	of	addressing	the	extreme	inequalities	that	had	
been	generated	by	the	industrial	revolution	and	subsequent	continuing	
industrial	restructuring.	In	addition,	the	great	depression	had	severely	
undermined	faith	in	the	operation	of	private	market	economies,	in	contrast	to	
the	success	of	dirigiste	state	planning	and	action	during	the	Second	World	War.		
	
The	argument	for	public	intervention	was	strengthened	by	the	challenge	of	post-
war	reconstruction	and	the	need	to	prevent	the	generation	of	speculative	profits	
from	such	activities	(Prest,	1981).	In	the	1945	election,	all	three	main	political	
parties	were	committed	to	using	the	state	to	achieve	these	ends	(Cherry,	1996).	
“An	enthusiasm	for	economic	and	social	planning	in	national	affairs	swept	town	
planning	along,	its	technical	prowess	accepted	as	expert	guidance,	and	its	claim	
to	represent	‘higher	interests’	as	yet	unsullied.”	(Cherry,	1996,	213)	In	essence,	
corporatist	approaches	to	the	capture	of	land	value	by	the	state	from	private	
landowners	eschewed	the	use	of	the	market	for	the	exchange	of	land	and	the	
setting	of	its	price.	Instead,	they	emphasised	the	redistribution	of	value	from	
individuals	to	the	community	in	the	form	of	the	state.	
	
The	land	value	provisions	of	the	Town	and	Country	Planning	Act	1947	were	
introduced	in	an	attempt	to	establish	an	effective	planning	system	and	to	achieve	
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financial	equity	between	society	and	landowners.	In	place	of	full-scale	land	
nationalisation,	the	key	change	introduced	by	the	1947	Act	was	the	
nationalisation	of	development	rights.	One	signifier	of	this	was	the	£300m	fund	
that	was	established	to	meet	claims	for	compensation	from	owners	of	land	that	
had	development	value	when	the	Act	took	effect	(see	Clawson	and	Hall,	1973).		
	
Such	an	approach	followed	that	proposed	by	the	Uthwatt	Committee	(1941)	and	
had	fundamental	implications	for	the	operation	of	the	land	market.	A	landowner	
who	sells	land	to	a	private	developer,	receives	a	price	(market	value)	the	bulk	of	
which	is	attributable	to	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	develop	(the	development	
value).	This	right	is	now	owned	by	the	state.	Consequently,	a	development	
charge	was	levied	on	the	landowner	to	recoup	100	per	cent	of	development	
value	(Figure	1b(i)).		Because	the	refusal	of	planning	permission	no	longer	
prevents	a	landowner	from	exercising	any	of	his/her	rights	over	land,	no	
compensation	was	payable.	The	public	developer	purchasing	land	for	
development	acquired	it	at	current	use	value	(that	is,	net	of	the	development	
charge).	In	essence,	while	the	state	did	not	nationalise	land,	it	sought	to	take	
control	of	the	land	market	and	reconstruct	it	in	ways	which	ended	unearned	
windfalls	gains	and	channelled	the	proceeds	from	increasing	land	values	back	to	
communities	(Fitzpatrick,	2016).	
	
These	arrangements	created	an	effective	planning	system	because	the	refusal	of	
planning	permission	had	no	direct	financial	consequences	for	the	local	planning	
authority.	Individual	landowners	were	treated	equally:	all	received	the	same	
price	for	their	land,	whatever	the	circumstances.	However,	setting	the	price	at	
current	use	value	removed	any	financial	incentive	for	landowners	to	sell	land	for	
development.	The	Uthwatt	Committee	(1941)	had	foreseen	this	eventuality	and	
had	recommended	that	general	powers	of	compulsory	purchase,	appropriately	
funded,	be	granted	to	local	planning	authorities	(Cullingworth,	1975).	In	effect,	
state	acquisition	would	replace	the	market	to	ensure	that	an	adequate	supply	of	
land	was	forthcoming	for	development	to	meet	the	needs	of	society.		Under	the	
1947	Act,	local	authorities	were	given	compulsory	purchase	powers	but	limits	
were	placed	on	their	funding	such	that	they	could	only	be	exercised	in	a	limited	
way.	In	the	face	of	mass	withholding	of	land	from	the	market	by	landowners,	
these	powers	proved	totally	inadequate.	The	land	market	ground	to	a	halt.		
		
The	incoming	Conservative	government	of	1951	had	the	choice	either	of	
increasing	funding	for	compulsory	purchase	or	of	restoring	the	financial	
incentive	for	landowners	to	sell,	and,	hence	for	the	land	market	to	operate.	They	
chose	the	latter.	However,	the	right	to	develop	land	remained	nationalised.	This	
underpinned	the	continuing	effectiveness	of	the	planning	system	because	no	
compensation	was	paid	for	refusal	of	planning	permission.	But	equality	of	
treatment	was	effectively	abandoned.	Community	generated	development	values	
were	retained	by	landowners	who	received	planning	permission	but	were	
denied	to	those	who	did	not1.	Fitzpatrick’s	(2016,	66)	claim	that	“a	socialised,	
																																																								
1	And	a	reduced	form	of	this	unequal	treatment	–	related	to	the	proportion	of	the	land	
development	value	that	accrued	to	landowners	following	the	grant	of	planning	permission	-	was	
incorporated	into	the	Land	Commission	Act,	1967	and	(minimally	and	temporarily)	into	the	
Community	Land	Scheme.	
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redistributive	measure	like	the	betterment	levy	never	took	hold”	is	accurate	in	
that	the	particular	(micro-level)	policy	instrument	changed	with	changes	in	
national	government.	However,	the	normative	idea	of	governmental	land	control	
(cutting	across	meso	and	macro	levels)	was	firmly	established	and	was	to	endure.		
	
On	returning	to	power	in	the	1960s,	Labour	made	another	attempt	at	land	value	
capture	which	followed	similar	principles	to	the	1947	regime,	although	it	
differed	in	its	detailed	design.	The	Land	Commission	Act,	1967	introduced	a	
compromise	approach	to	the	taxation	of	development	value	(Cullingworth,	
1980).	A	betterment	levy	initially	set	at	40	per	cent	of	development	value	was	
introduced	(Figure	1b(ii)).		Acquisitions	by	public	bodies	would	occur	net	of	this	
levy.	Such	an	approach,	it	was	suggested,	would	recoup	for	the	community	some	
of	the	development	value	it	created	and	leave	sufficient	with	the	landowner	to	
enable	the	land	market	to	continue	functioning.	In	parallel	with	this,	the	Land	
Commission	was	established.	This	was	a	central	government	body	equipped	with	
powers	of	land	acquisition,	management	and	disposal	that	it	could	use	to	
assemble	and	release	land	for	development	where	such	action	was	needed.	The	
provisions	of	the	Land	Commission	Act,	1967	did	not	work	largely	because	the	
Conservatives	promised	to	repeal	the	Act	if	they	were	returned	to	power.	
Landowners	withheld	land	from	the	market	on	a	large	scale	in	anticipation	of	
receiving	100	per	cent	of	development	value	rather	than	60	per	cent.	
	
Labour	was	not	deterred	by	these	failures.	As	Weiler	(2013)	perceptively	
observes,	while	the	party	became	bitterly	divided	on	a	range	of	policy	issues,	the	
desire	to	control	land	and	the	profits	that	would	result	won	broad	party	support,	
not	least	because	it	was	linked	to	the	issue	of	the	delivery	of	housing.	Labour’s	
next	attempt	to	capture	land	values	occurred	under	the	Community	Land	
Scheme	(CLS).	The	provisions	of	the	Community	Land	Act	1975	effectively	
followed	the	principles	set	out	by	the	Uthwatt	Report.	Ultimately,	all	land	
required	for	what	was	termed	‘relevant	development’2	would	be	acquired	at	
current	use	value	by	local	planning	authorities	and,	where	not	needed	for	public	
purposes,	would	be	sold	on	to	private	developers	at	full	market	value.	The	
development	values	thus	obtained	would	be	used	to	fund	subsequent	land	
purchases.	In	other	words,	the	CLS	proposed	the	replacement	of	the	private	
market	in	land	by	state	action.		
	
To	cover	the	period	between	the	introduction	of	CLS	and	the	time	when	local	
authorities	would	have	the	competence,	experience	and	resources	necessary	to	
engage	in	wholesale	land	trading,	a	Development	Land	Tax	was	introduced.		The	
initial	rate	was	set	at	80	per	cent	of	development	value,	rising	to	100	per	cent	at	
the	date	when	the	private	market	in	land	was	wholly	replaced	(Figure	1b(iii)).	
The	CLS	failed	because	of	political	opposition	–	landowners	withheld	land	from	
the	market	in	anticipation	of	the	return	of	a	Conservative	government	and	the	
removal	of	Development	Land	Tax	–	and	because	the	compulsory	acquisition	
powers	granted	to	local	authorities	were	inadequately	funded	-	as	with	the	Town	
																																																								
2	‘Relevant	development’	was	development	above	a	size	threshold	that	excluded	minor	schemes	
to	avoid	administrative	sclerosis.	
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and	Country	Planning	Act	1947	they	proved	wholly	inadequate	in	the	face	of	
intransigent	landowners.	
	
Normative	ideas	and	economic	rationality	
In	this	brief	history,	we	can	see	the	entwining	of	both	the	normative	and	
cognitive	elements	of	discourse.	The	Attlee	government	faced	a	basic	dilemma	in	
its	attempts	to	capture	land	values	that	would	continue	throughout	the	
corporatist	era.	The	Uthwatt	Committee	advised	that,	in	a	society	underpinned	
by	the	principle	of	individualistic	ownership,	land	nationalisation	was	politically	
unacceptable	(Cullingworth,	1975).	Yet,	as	we	have	seen,	an	un-reformed	private	
market	in	land	would	prevent	the	planning	system	from	securing	“…	a	proper	
balance	between	the	competing	demands	for	land,	so	that	all	the	land	of	the	
country	is	used	in	the	best	interests	of	the	whole	people.”	(Hansard	(Commons)	
1946/47,	volume	432,	column	947;	cited	in	Prest,	1981,	90).	The	nationalisation	
of	development	rights	provided	an	operationally	practicable	solution	to	this	
dilemma.	
	
Great	play	has	been	made	of	the	fact	that,	at	the	time,	“…	elementary	economic	
price	theory	played	no	part	whatever	in	their	reasoning;	it	was	a	pariah	...	What	
mattered	was	national	and	rational	planning	of	land.”	(Uthwatt	Committee,	Final	
Report,	p.	23;	cited	in	Prest,	1981,	79).	This	was	a	call	to	defy	economic	
rationality	in	order	to	legitimise	land	reform	normatively.	The	argument	was	an	
ethical	rather	than	an	economic	one.	It	rested	on	the	long-held	and	frequently	
expressed	claim	that	LVC	was	an	expression	of	“…	the	right	of	the	community	to	
a	share	in	what	has	been	created	by	the	community	…”	(Hansard	(Commons)	
1931,	Vol.	251,	Col.	1411;	cited	in	Prest,	1981,	117).	Here	again	can	be	seen	an	
attempt	to	tie	together	cognitive	and	the	normative	elements:	not	only	is	it	
morally	right	to	prevent	unearned	windfalls,	returning	these	to	the	community,	
but	it	also	makes	the	planning	process	more	efficient	and	effective.		
	
The	Labour	government	was	not	ignorant	of	the	economic	issues	raised	by	the	
compensation	and	betterment	provisions	of	the	Town	and	Country	Planning	Act	
1947.	It	was	advised	that	“The	State	leaves	the	actual	ownership	of	the	land	in	
private	hands	but	takes	away	the	profit	motive,	the	main	spring	of	private	
enterprise,	by	nationalising	the	development	value.”	Chester	(1945)	Minute	to	
the	Lord	President	on	C.B.	(45)	6.	27	October	1945,	Treasury	File	L.B.	171/46/03,	
Part	A;	cited	in	Cullingworth,	1975,	259)	Consequently,	departmental	officials	
stressed	that	“…	probably	in	the	early	days	of	the	new	land	procedure	it	would	
be	necessary	to	acquire	compulsorily	in	a	large	proportion	of	cases.”	
(Cullingworth,	1975,	247)	In	short,	it	was	expected	that	state	intervention	would	
diminish	or	even	supplant	the	role	of	the	private	market	as	the	means	of	
providing	land	for	development.	The	position	of	the	Labour	Party	in	this	regard	
changed	little	between	1947	and	1976,	and	was	expressed	in	the	clearest	terms	
in	the	Land	White	Paper	of	1974.	Under	the	CLS	
	
…	it	is	the	Government’s	intention	to	lay	a	duty	on	local	authorities	to	
acquire	all	land	required	for	private	development.	From	the	date	that	
the	duty	is	brought	in,	no	development	will	be	allowed	to	begin	save	
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on	land	owned	by	a	public	authority,	or	made	available	by	them	for	
this	purpose.	(HMG,	1974,	5)	
	
Prior	to	1979,	the	Labour	Party	consistently	explicated	the	cognitive	dimensions	
of	the	need	for	land-use	planning,	while	simultaneously	attempting	to	make	the	
normative	case	for	LVC.	Meanwhile,	the	Conservatives	had	adopted	a	position	
that	made	it	appear	as	though	it	simply	represented	the	interests	of	the	
landowners	who	successfully	fought	a	rear-guard	action	against	LVC	policy3.	The	
debate	about	LVC	during	this	era	ebbed	and	flowed.	The	overall	right	of	the	state	
to	plan	development	and	the	nationalisation	of	land	development	rights	were	
secured.	However,	LVC	was	highly	politicized	and	the	establishment	of	a	policy	
equilibrium	proved	to	be	very	difficult	to	achieve	
	
The	evolution	of	a	neo-liberal	approach	to	land	value	capture	
	
As	a	field	of	practice,	planning	and	land	value	capture	should	have	been	at	the	
forefront	of	the	neoliberal	project.	Yet	Evans	(2003a,	197-198)	argued	that	“…	in	
planning,	the	plan	is	an	end	in	itself:	its	achievement	is	an	aim	and	its	economic	
consequences	are	largely	irrelevant.”	That	he	could	say	this	over	20	years	after	
the	onset	of	the	neoliberal	project	in	the	UK	is	a	reflection	of	the	uneven	nature	
of	neoliberalisation,	its	distinct	periodisation	and	the	capacity	of	the	planning	to	
mediate	macro-level	policy	ideas	as	they	cascade	down	to	the	local,	operational	
level.	The	planning	system	was	sufficiently	flexible	and	robust	to	reconcile	
changing	political	ends	and	means	and	to	deal	with	and	mask	any	resulting	
tensions	(Allmendinger	and	Tewdwr-Jones,	2000).	
	
Consequently,	until	the	Millennium,	it	was	possible	to	conclude	that	planning	had	
taken	little	or	no	account	of	price	or	other	economic	indicators.	The	quantum	of	
land	to	be	allocated	to	any	given	use	was	decided	by	the	planning	system.	The	
market	then	distributed	that	land	between	competing	bidders	(Cheshire	and	
Sheppard,	2004).	“The	view	would	seem	to	be,	and	is	sometimes	stated	as	such,	
that	it	is	for	planners	to	plan	and	the	economy	to	adjust	to	the	plan.”	(Evans,	
2003b,	528)	However,	continuing	contextual	changes	made	this	position	less	and	
less	tenable.		
	
Before	1979,	developers	generally	funded	on-site	infrastructure	and	paid	for	
connections	to	off-site	infrastructure.	The	latter	was	provided	at	no	immediate	
direct	cost	to	the	developer	by	public	utilities	funded	through	a	combination	of	
user	charges	and	government	transfers.	Those	services	such	as	education	that	
were	used	by	the	occupiers	of	new	developments	were	financed	by	general	
taxation.	However,	the	make-up	and	distribution	of	development	costs	and	
values	were	transformed	by	the	introduction	of	a	low-tax	environment	and	the	
privatisation	of	the	utilities.	Landowners	and	developers	no	longer	assume	that,	
apart	from	on-site	provision	and	local	connections,	land	will	be	serviced	at	no	
direct	cost	by	privately	operated	utilities	or	by	public	providers.	Instead,	the	
immediate	financial	burden	of	such	provision	has	been	shifted	more	to	building	
																																																								
3	The	position	of	the	Conservatives	was	more	nuanced	than	this.	By	1972	the	Conservatives	had	
become	concerned	 that	 the	party	might	become	 linked	with	 land	speculation.	 In	response	 they	
proposed	significantly	to	increase	the	tax	rate	on	land	value	gains	(Weiler,	2013).		
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producers	and	consumers.	Landowners	must	now	absorb	a	greater	proportion	of	
the	cost	of	off-site	infrastructure	by	reducing	land	prices.	This	is	a	pre-requisite	
for	making	their	land	developable.	
	
The	vehicle	for	achieving	this	transfer	of	resources	was	the	evolving	system	of	
planning	obligations.	Planning	obligations	(POs)	are	defined	in	planning	
agreements	that	were	first	given	statutory	recognition	in	the	Town	&	Country	
Planning	Act	1932	(Amodu,	2006).	They	were	originally	detailed	procedural	
devices	that	were	used	to	address	particular	problems	raised	by	developments	
that	could	not	be	solved	through	the	use	of	planning	conditions;	for	example,	to	
provide	adequate	site	access	by	correcting	deficiencies	in	off-site	transport	
infrastructure	or	services.	Through	their	use,	POs	might	allow	development	to	
proceed	where	otherwise	it	would	not.	During	the	1980s	and	1990s,	as	the	
financial	environment	of	local	authorities	became	increasingly	austere,	there	was	
a	broadening	in	the	scope	and	an	expansion	in	the	use	of	POs	from	this	quite	
specific	base.	For	example,	POs	began	to	require	the	provision	of	affordable	
housing,	of	social	and	community	facilities	or	of	public	open	space	(Campbell	et	
al,	2000).	This	trend	was	encouraged	by	government,	at	least	partly	because	
there	were	no	suitable	alternative	mechanisms	available	for	redistributing	and	
recovering	the	costs	and	benefits	of	development.		
	
During	the	New	Labour	years,	consideration	was	increasingly	given	to	the	‘…	
scope	for	improving	the	efficiency	of	the	planning	system	through	the	use	of	
economic	instruments	in	planning	policy	…’	(DETR,	1998,	8)	such	as	POs.	One	
constraint	on	their	use	was	a	necessity	test	that	limited	the	scope	of	obligations	
that	might	be	imposed	on	developers.	This	significantly	reduced	the	opportunity	
to	use	POs	to	support	local	service	provision,	resulting	in	pressure	for	additional	
public	expenditure	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	development	(DETR,	2001,	17).	In	
contrast,	if	more	widely	used	and	defined,	POs	would	act	as	“…	a	mechanism	to	
ensure	that	development	provides	social,	economic	and	environmental	benefits	
to	the	community	as	a	whole.”	(DETR,	2001,	3)	This	sharing	of	the	benefits	of	
development	with	the	community	was	subsequently	confirmed	as	a	fundamental	
aspect	of	the	PO	system	(ODPM,	2003,	para.18a).	
	
Now,	by	omission,	planning	obligations	have	become	a	vehicle	
through	which	development-related	infrastructure	and	service	
provision	may	be	funded	[…]	Yet	their	use	as	economic	instruments	
has	occurred	in	a	piecemeal	way.	(Campbell	et	al,	2000,	760)	
	
Such	changes	reflected	the	broader	shift	in	the	British	state	away	from	direct	
provision	of	services	and	towards	complex	regulatory	approaches	using	state	
power	to	renegotiate	market	relations	(Moran,	2003;	Levi-Faur,	2005).	However,	
the	increasing	importance	of	developments	as	a	source	of	finance	for	the	
mitigation	of	development	impact	and	the	provision	of	development	
infrastructure	posed	two	significant	problems	for	policymakers.		
	
The	first	was	the	fear	that	“…	authorities	risk	asking	for	too	much,	thereby	
threatening	the	viability	of	development.”	(DETR,	2001,	13).	On	the	one	hand,	
POs	should	benefit	society	and	contribute	to	economic	growth	but,	on	the	other	
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hand,	they	should	not	be	so	onerous	as	to	deter	development	(ODPM,	2003,	para.	
18).	However,	while	this	was	the	first	time	that	development	viability	had	been	
explicitly	linked	to	PO	policy,	consideration	of	the	“…	issue	of	whether	or	not	a	
development	proposal	is	capable	of	bearing	the	burden	of	mitigating	all	its	own	
costs	…”	(ODPM,	2004,	9)	was	taken	little	further.	The	Government’s	formal	
position	on	this	point	was	‘open’	(see	ODPM,	2005,	10-11,	para.	B10).	This	
encapsulates	the	essential	elements	and	highlights	the	internal	tensions	of	roll-
out	neoliberalism.	The	centrality	of	market	forces	in	guiding	development	was	
advanced	but	the	state	remained	a	powerful	actor	in	shaping	the	economic	
domain.		
	
The	second	problem	related	to	the	implications	that	the	continued	expansion	of	
the	use	of	POs	had	for	planning.	In	order	to	increase	the	transparency	and	
consistency	of	relevant	decisions,	policies	relating	to	POs	were	incorporated	in	
most	development	plans	by	2000	(Campbell	et	al,	2000;	Campbell	and	
Henneberry,	2005).	This	rendered	PO	policies	a	material	consideration	in	
determining	planning	applications	(ODPM,	2003,	para.	37).	Decisions	were	based	
not	only	on	a	proposal’s	functional	appropriateness	but	also	on	its	ability	to	meet	
the	costs	of	mitigating	its	likely	impact.	This,	in	turn,	is	determined	by	the	
development’s	value	and	profitability.	The	result	is	that	“…	essentially	financial	
matters	…	[became]	…	material	to	many	planning	decisions	…”	(Campbell	et	al,	
2000,	773,	square	bracket	added)	resulting	in	the	“…	marketization	of	the	
planning	process	…”(Campbell	et	al,	2000,	774).	
	
Economists	agreed.	Corkindale	(2004,	57)	suggested	that	“…the	most	obvious	
way	in	which	such	voluntary	trading	takes	place	in	British	land	use	planning	is	
through	the	device	known	as	‘planning	gain’	or	‘planning	obligations’.”	Indeed,	
“Planners	[will]	have	to	adjust	to	a	world	in	which	the	economic	as	well	as	the	
planning	logic	of	what	they	do	is	not	just	analysed	but	central	to	their	concerns.”	
(Cheshire	and	Sheppard,	2004,	2,	square	bracket	added).	Such	third-order	ideas	
now	challenged	the	forces	previously	mediating	their	effects	at	the	meso	and	
micro	levels	of	planning	practice.	
	
The	vehicle	for	this	incorporation	of	economic	logic	into	planning	is	the	concept	
of	viability.	Its	application	is	informed	by	financial	information,	the	provision	of	
which	was	first	formally	mentioned	in	Circular	05/2005	(ODPM,	2005)	in	
relation	to	the	determination	of	levels	of	affordable	housing	to	be	included	in	
residential	developments	(McAllister	et	al,	2013,	496).	Subsequently,	the	
evidence	base	of	core	strategies	and	other	development	plan	documents	was	
required	to	cover	viability	(DCLG,	2008).	Next,	PPS3:	Housing	(DCLG,	2010)	
made	it	necessary	to	assess	the	economic	viability	of	affordable	housing	targets	
(Coleman	et	al,	2013).	This	drive	to	establish	the	significance	of	financial	
considerations	in	planning	was	reinforced	by	the	National	Planning	Policy	
Framework	(DCLG,	2012).		
	
Pursuing	sustainable	development	requires	careful	attention	to	
viability	and	costs	…	[developments]	should	not	be	subject	to	such	a	
scale	of	obligations	and	policy	burdens	that	their	ability	to	be	
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developed	viably	is	threatened.	(DCLG,	2012,	41,	square	brackets	
added)	
	
Thus,	over	the	last	15	years	development	viability	has	become	an	important	
aspect	of	the	UK	planning	system	(Crosby	et	al,	2013).	It	informs	policy	relating	
POs	and	the	Community	Infrastructure	Levy	(CIL),	affordable	housing	and	land	
allocations.	It	underpins	negotiations	between	local	planning	authorities	and	
developers	over	specific	sites.	However,	there	has	been	considerable	debate	over	
the	definition	and	application	of	the	concept	of	viability.	The	RICS	(2012)	issued	
guidance	on	financial	viability	for	planning	purposes	that	defined	it	as	follows.	
	
An	objective	financial	viability	test	of	the	ability	of	a	development	
project	to	meet	its	costs	including	the	cost	of	planning	obligations,	
while	ensuring	an	appropriate	Site	Value	for	the	landowner	and	a	
market	risk	adjusted	return	to	the	developer	in	delivering	that	project.	
(RICS,	2012,	4)	
	
It	noted	that	‘The	residual	appraisal	methodology	for	financial	viability	testing	is	
normally	used	…’	(RICS,	2012,	14).	Thus	the	RICS	was	claiming	the	objectivity	of	
the	results	of	a	residual	valuation	as	a	justification	for	using	the	techniques	as	the	
means	of	determining	the	viability	of	a	scheme.	This	was	despite	the	long-held	
view	that		
	
…	it	is	a	feature	of	the	residual	valuation	that	comparatively	minor	
adjustments	to	the	constituent	figures	can	have	a	major	effect	on	
results	…	[and	that]	…	once	valuers	are	let	loose	on	residual	
valuations,	however	honest	the	valuers	and	however	reasoned	their	
argument	they	can	prove	almost	anything.	(First	Garden	City	Ltd	v	
Letchworth	Garden	City	Corporation	(1966)	200	EG	123,	460).	
	
It	was	also	in	the	face	of	recent	robust	technical	criticism	of	the	residual	method	
and	mounting	evidence	of	its	proneness	to	gaming	by	developers	to	reduce	levels	
of	POs	(Crosby	and	Wyatt,	2016;	McAllister,	2017).		
	
Following	research	sponsored	by	a	group	of	London	Boroughs	(Sayce	et	al,	2017)	
and	a	recent	landmark	judgement	of	the	High	Court	on	the	matter	(see	Crosby,	
this	issue),	policy	guidance	on	DVA	has	been	changed.	Gone	is	the	imperative	in	
the	NPPF	2012	to	ensure	that	POs	do	not	threaten	viability.	Instead,	the	NPPF	
2018	states	that	“Where	up-to-date	policies	have	set	out	the	contributions	
expected	from	development,	planning	applications	that	comply	with	them	should	
be	assumed	to	be	viable.”	(MHCLG,	2018,	16)	This	position	is	emphasized	by	the	
latest	guidance	on	viability	that	stresses	that	evidence	used	to	assess	land	values	
should	be	“…	based	on	developments	which	are	compliant	with	policies,	
including	for	affordable	housing	…”	(HMG,	2018,	paragraph	14)	Thus	a	
reappraisal	of	the	detailed	operation	of	the	extant	LVC	system	is	currently	
underway	(see	Crosby,	this	issue,	for	a	detailed	discussion).	However,	the	
principles	that	underpin	the	system	are	not	in	question.	
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The	effect	of	the	shift	to	a	neo-liberal	approach	to	LVC	
As	we	have	seen,	corporatist	approaches	to	LVC	were	intended	both	to	reinforce	
the	effectiveness	of	the	land	use	planning	system	and	to	obtain	for	the	
community	(at	least	a	significant	share	of)	the	increase	in	land	value	arising	from	
its	efforts.	They	had	no	effect	on	development	costs	or	capital	values.	Rather,	
they	were	focused	on	taxing	land	development	values.	Consequently,	their	
primary	effect	was	on	the	behaviour	of	landowners	and	the	operation	of	the	land	
market.	Tax	rates	were	the	same	for	all	types	of	development	in	all	locations.	The	
tax	monies	were	recycled	through	the	Exchequer	and	it	was	not	obvious	that	
they	would	be	used	in	ways	that	would	benefit	landowners	(such	as	by	paying	
for	the	provision	of	off-site	infrastructure	to	enable	development	to	occur).	
	
Practice	relating	to	POs/CIL	is	markedly	different.	Their	subject	is	the	developer	
not	the	landowner.	They	affect	both	the	capital	value	of	a	development	(which	is	
reduced	by	the	inclusion	of	affordable	housing)	and	a	scheme’s	development	
costs	(that	now	include	a	contribution	to	the	provision	of	infrastructure),	
thereby	reducing	land	development	value	(Figure	1c).	Effectively,	this	is	the	
equivalent	of	an	indirect	tax	on	development	value	but	it	is	structured	quite	
differently.	Any	obligations	or	levies	must	be	directly	related	to	development	and	
must	be	of	a	scale	and	nature	necessary	to	mitigate	its	impact.	The	proceeds	of	
POs/CIL	are	hypothecated.	Landowners	and	developers	can	see	that	they	are	
used	for	purposes,	primarily	the	provision	of	off-site	infrastructure,	which	allow	
land	to	be	developed.		
	
As	the	use	of	POs	grew	rapidly	after	2000,	there	was	debate	about	whether	they	
might	be	augmented	or	replaced	by	a	tax	on	development	value,	either	directly	
through	Planning	Gain	Supplement	(House	of	Commons,	2006)	or	through	
community	land	auctions,	a	form	of	municipal	land	trading	(Leunig,	2011).	In	the	
event,	POs	were	paired	with	CIL	and	the	system	continued	to	be	cost-base.	Tax	
and	charge	regimes	have	different	advantages	and	disadvantages	(Henneberry	
and	Goodchild,	1996).	A	tax	on	some	element	of	land	or	property	values	goes	
with	the	financial	structure	of	the	market.	If	tax	rates	are	uniform,	the	relative	
impact	on	different	parts	of	the	property/land	market	is	the	same.	“…	only	if	all	
land	is	taxed	at	the	same	flat	rate	…	will	there	be	no	distortion	in	land	use.”	
(Whitehead,	2016,	23)		
	
In	contrast,	the	pattern	of	charges	based	on	development	impact	differs	from	
that	of	market	strength.	Economic	factors	determine	property	values.	Physical	
factors	such	as	the	scale	and	nature	of	development	determine	development	
impact.	Property	values	display	marked	regional,	sectoral	and	temporal	variation.		
The	costs	of	the	physical	works	necessary	to	mitigate	development	impact	vary	
relatively	little.	Consequently,	weak	markets	are	faced	with	much	greater	
adjustment	problems	than	strong	markets.	Charges	raise	development	costs	in	
London	and	the	South	East	by	a	much	lower	proportion	than	in	other	regions.	In	
this	sense,	charging	systems	are	regressive	in	their	effects.	This	is	evident	from	
the	outcomes	of	the	negotiations	over	planning	obligations.	POs	accompany	a	
much	higher	proportion	of	planning	permissions	granted	by	authorities	in	the	
South	than	in	the	North	and	the	average	value	of	the	obligations	is	significantly	
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higher	in	the	South	than	the	North	(Campbell	et	al,	2000;	Crook	et	al,	2006,	2008,	
2010;	Henneberry,	2016).		
	
Conclusions	
	
Discursive	institutionalism	provides	a	framework	within	which	to	consider	the	
ways	that	fundamental	changes	in	political	economy	play	themselves	out.	While	
it	has	been	criticised	for	its	limited	ability	to	make	strong	causative	claims	for	the	
power	of	ideas,	its	elasticity	as	a	concept	makes	it	useful	for	coping	with	the	
heterogeneity	of	real-world	processes.		Neoliberalism’s	rise	to	dominance	has,	in	
practice,	been	messy	(Harvey,	2005;	Peck	2010).	The	macro-level	shift	in	the	
climate	of	ideas	after	1979,	while	clear,	was	far	from	a	‘clean	break’.	Analysts	of	
the	Thatcherite	project	who	focus	on	macro-level	(third-order)	ideational	change	
(e.g.	Jessop	et	al.,	1988)	tend	to	stress	discontinuities.	In	contrast,	those	focusing	
analysis	on	meso	and	micro	levels	(second-	and	first-orders)	tend,	instead,	to	
emphasise	the	unevenness	of	policy	change,	including	policy	continuities	(Hay	
and	Farrall,	2011).	Such	differences	in	analytical	focus	are	not	logically	
incompatible.	Gaps	between	radical	macro-ideational	change	and	more	
incremental	change	at	meso	and	micro	levels	might	arise	from	implementation	
failures	or	intentional,	strategic	in/action	(Hay	and	Farrall,	2011).		
	
These	tendencies	are	evident	in	the	area	of	LVC.	The	country	has	a	long	history	of	
debate	and	policy	experimentation	relating	to	the	issue.	Using	discursive	
institutionalism,	we	have	shown	how	third-order	changes	in	political	economy	
affect	the	land	market	and	how	these	interact	with	policy	and	practice	at	meso	
and	micro	levels	of	planning	(summarised	in	Table	1).	The	impact	of	ideas	is	not	
immediate	and	can	be	heavily	mediated	or	even	resisted.	As	the	corporatist	era	
demonstrated,	economic	(landowning)	interests	were	able	to	prevent	the	
implementation	of	betterment	schemes.	This	was	achieved	because	such	action	
was	supported	by	the	Conservative	Party	that	reversed	various	Labour	policies	
for	LVC.	However,	such	reversals	were	not	complete:	the	planning	system	
inaugurated	by	the	1947	Act	remained	largely	intact	and	the	normative	claim	
that	the	community	should	have	the	right	to	a	share	of	development	values	has	
endured,	albeit	evolving	significantly	over	time.	
	
Table	1:	Applying	Discursive	Institutionalism	to	Land	Value	Capture	
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Similarly,	the	increasing	influence	of	neoliberalism	on	the	form	of	LVC	policy	was	
uneven	and	incremental,	only	taking	effect	from	the	Millennium.	Until	then,	the	
planning	system	had	been	able	to	ameliorate	the	effects	of	neoliberalism.	
However,	the	increasing	deployment	of	economic	instruments	had	a	significant	
impact	in	three	ways.	First,	planners	were	confronted	with	the	need	to	
incorporate	market	viability	as	a	material	consideration	in	reaching	decisions.	
Neoliberalism	has	advanced	economic	rationality	and	economic	rationality	has	
advanced	neoliberal	reasoning	in	planning	practice.	Planners	have	to	engage	
with	market	actors	on	different	terms	from	the	corporatist	era	as	a	consequence	
and	find	themselves	contesting	the	form	of	such	economic	concepts	as	
development	viability.	Second,	and	relatedly,	planning	is	increasingly	embedded	
in	the	practices	of	the	regulatory	state	(Moran,	2003)	that	emerged	from	
neoliberalisation	in	the	UK.	Third,	the	land	market	itself	has	been	affected	by	
economic	instruments	as	is	demonstrated	by	the	regionally	regressive	effects	of	
the	PO/CIL	regime.		
	
What	are	the	implications	of	this	analysis	for	planning	practice?	At	present,	
planners	are	faced	with	a	conflict	between	cognitive	and	normative	ideas	about	
how	they	should	respond	to	a	more	market	orientated	planning	system.	On	the	
one	hand,	market-driven	practice	challenges	the	institutional	ethic	of	a	planning	
profession	rooted	in	the	institutionalisation	of	the	welfare	state.	On	the	other	
hand,	in	an	era	of	ever-increasing	constraints	on	local	government	funding,	the	
benefits	of	obtaining	additional	resources	through	effective	PO/CIL	policy	and	
practice	are	clear.	Thus	far,	this	conflict	has	been	managed	by	planners’	focus	on	
improving	site-level	approaches	(c.f.	the	debate	over	project	viability	and	the	
gaming	of	land	valuation).	However,	in	order	to	maximise	the	benefits	from	
POs/CIL,	it	is	necessary	to	pursue	market	sensitive	and	economically	aware	
approaches	in	relation	not	just	to	individual	projects	but	also	to	longer-term	
development	plan	policies	and	their	application.	For	example,	there	may	be	an	
area	of	high	demand	where,	for	some	reason,	development	has	been	restricted.	
Allowing	schemes	to	go	ahead	may	garner	substantial	developer	contributions	
that	result	in	the	construction	of	major	new	infrastructure.	In	turn,	this	may	
remove	constraints	on	the	development	of	less	valuable	land	elsewhere	in	the	
plan	area.	Other	policy	objectives	are	then	achieved,	to	the	overall	benefit	of	the	
locale.	There	is	no	evidence	that	planners	have	adopted	such	approaches	and,	
through	them,	faced	up	to	the	wider	strategic	implications	of	their	position.	
	
Discursive	institutionalism	can	make	important	analytical	contributions	to	
planning	studies	beyond	LVC.	While	regard	is	already	paid	to	both	macro	and	
micro-level	ideological	shifts,	planning	studies	could	fruitfully	develop	more	
nuanced	analyses	of	policy	change	by	using	discursive	institutionalism	to	
examine	how	such	changes	in	policy	are	set	in	train	and	how	they	are	justified,	
while	also	recognising	the	inherent	messiness	of	such	transitions.	The	flexibility	
of	the	concept	means	that	it	may	be	applied	widely.	However,	as	our	paper	has	
shown,	its	use	is	most	effective	when	the	subject	policy	is	underpinned	by	an	
essential	aspect	of	political	economy	that	exhibits	significant	change.	A	suitable	
candidate	for	study	would	be	the	extension	of	permitted	development	rights	that	
has	occurred	since	1979	and	particularly	in	the	last	10	years	(see	Bibby	et	al,	
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2018).	This	may	be	seen	as	an	embodiment	of	the	de-regulatory	urge	within	
neoliberalism.	It	offers	considerable	analytical	potential.	
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